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Carbon Intensity Standards: A Distraction and a Danger to
Real Action on Climate Change
Andrew Greene*
I.

Introduction

It is only a matter of time, if not during the 111th Congress then
certainly within the next presidential term, before Congress passes major
legislation addressing climate change. Public perception about the scale of
the problem and the need for commensurate action has shifted
momentously while legislators, business leaders and environmentalists
have collaborated on a multitude of proposals without achieving a
consensus. Proposals have ranged from imposing a carbon tax to promoting
voluntary conservation. However, the approach that has gained the most
traction so far is implementing an absolute cap on greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and allowing major emitters to trade allowances according to
their needs. Similar cap-and-trade programs have already been introduced
around the world and in regions of the U.S. The popularity of these policies
stems from their efficiency – the costs of complying with a cap are lowered
because market forces ensure that reductions occur wherever they can be
made most cheaply. This approach is contained in Senate Bill 2191,
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner, titled America’s Climate
Security Act of 2007.
Fearing that this means of addressing climate change would put U.S.
producers of energy-intensive products at a competitive disadvantage, the
steel industry, as represented by the American Iron and Steel Institute and
Nucor Steel, has presented an alternative proposal – establishing “carbon
intensity standards,” or limits on the amount of CO2 emissions allowed in
the production of certain products. Carbon intensity is a ratio of the amount
of carbon released into the atmosphere per unit of production or amount of
economic value created.1 The steel industry’s idea is to apply performance

* J.D., UC Hastings, 2008; B.A., English, UC Berkeley, 1998. I would like to thank
Professor Joel Paul for introducing me to international trade law and encouraging me
to pursue publication of this note, President-elect Barack Obama for ushering in a
renewed sense of patriotism and diminishing the prospect that carbon intensity
standards will form any part of America’s environmental policy, and my wife, Seema,
and son, Teja, for continuing to inspire me to strive for a better future for us all.
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standards that U.S. producers could easily meet to both domestically
produced and imported goods. Goods produced less efficiently than the
standards demanded would be banned from the U.S. market. This approach,
say its advocates, would lower emissions worldwide without harming U.S.
industry the way a cap-and-trade system would. As the merits of each
proposal have been debated in congressional hearings, it has also been
suggested that carbon intensity standards could complement a national
cap-and-trade program.
This article argues that carbon intensity standards represent a
diversion on the path to the low-carbon economy of the future. Indeed, in
addition to being extremely vulnerable to an attack in the WTO, they
discourage the kind of global cooperation that is needed to address climate
change seriously. This most recent reincarnation of energy intensity
standards is eerily reminiscent of the Bush administration’s pledge, made
shortly after the President announced that the U.S. did not intend to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol, to combat climate change by setting voluntary targets
for energy intensity that would likely be met while continuing to conduct
business as usual.2 Not only did U.S. GHG emissions continue to increase
at a steady rate under this policy, but the approach exemplifies the profound
unwillingness of the U.S. to provide genuine leadership on what many
believe to be the most important issue of our time and the ways in which
U.S. approaches to the problem are out of step with the rest of the world.
Furthermore, carbon intensity standards in this context represent the type of
unilateralism that has already earned the U.S. disapproval from the WTO.3
Part II of this article provides a brief overview on the difficulties of
instigating international action on this issue and the disincentives for
nations to act independently. Part III describes key features of the
Lieberman-Warner bill, which had already been reported out of the
Committee on Environment and Public Works when the last Congress
adjourned. Elements of the proposal are then analyzed under the general
provisions of the GATT and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement), as well as under Article XX, the environmental exceptions
provision of the GATT. Additionally, the broader policy implications of this

1. Timothy Herzog, Kevin B. Baumert & Jonathan Pershing, Word Resources
Institute, TARGET: INTENSITY: AN ANALYSIS OF GREENHOUSE GAS INTENSITY TARGETS 3 (2006).
2. Id. at 12. Energy intensity in developed countries (based on GDP) tends to
decline over time. This is due in part to more stringent environmental controls, but
also to shifts in the economy which result in greater wealth creation with lower
emissions, e.g., from manufacturing to computer services. Bush’s goal of reducing
intensity by 18 percent from 2002 to 2012 mirrored the 17-percent reduction that had
occurred between 1990 and 2002. Id. at 7.
3. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 186, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US – Shrimp].
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approach are evaluated. Part IV first discusses features of the carbon
intensity standards approach. After briefly addressing why such an
approach contravenes the general provisions of the GATT, it goes on to
analyze the claim that this proposal is consistent with the TBT Agreement4
and to evaluate whether carbon intensity standards could be justified under
Article XX. The broader limitations of this policy are discussed as well. Part
V elaborates on some additional considerations that would make a cap-andtrade program successful, including ways to solidify the U.S. position should
the program be challenged in a WTO dispute and to decrease the costs to
U.S. producers while increasing the environmental benefits to the planet.
This article concludes with a sort of eulogy to carbon intensity standards, in
the hopes that the U.S. will put to rest an arbitrary and patently self-serving
approach that has tended to animate only policymakers averse to taking real
action on climate change while garnering minimal support from
environmentalists and the international community.

II.

Free Trade and Climate Change – International Approaches

Climate change has been called the greatest and widest ranging
market failure ever seen.5 Though economists continue to debate the extent
to which greater trade over the last few decades has increased or
redistributed wealth,6 few observers doubt that it has raised the specter of
environmental problems on a scale never before witnessed by humankind.
Thus far, international bodies have had limited success at assuaging
concerns that protecting the environment and promoting trade are
incompatible goals, or that countries can cooperate to restrain
anthropogenic contributions to climate change as effectively as they have to
promote freer trade. That the U.S. has been unwilling to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol exacerbates these concerns, but even those countries that have

4. See Climate Change: Competitiveness Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing
Countries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of James Slattery, Counsel, American
Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), Steel Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Hearing].
5. Nicholas Stern, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS
(Cambridge University Press 2007).

OF

CLIMATE CHANGE 1

6. See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INTL. L. 285, 303 (2003) (“The political reality in the
United States makes it unlikely that the winners will be taxed to compensate the
losers.”); Jeff Faux, How NAFTA Failed Mexico: Immigration is Not a Development Policy, AM.
PROSPECT, July-Aug. 2003, at 35, 37.
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begun reductions under Kyoto have not made the degree of progress that
scientists say is necessary to avert global disaster.7
The first international treaty to address climate change was the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, entered into force in
1994. The UNFCCC obligated signatory nations to take action to combat
climate change, but it did not set specific targets on emissions or prescribe
a particular approach to reducing them.8 After President George H.W. Bush
signed the treaty, the Senate gave its advice and consent on October 7,
1992.9 Meetings among the signatory nations, known as Conventions of the
Parties (COPs), led to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, which did impose
specific caps on developed nations.10 Though the U.S. initially signed the
Protocol, the Senate later passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution by 95-0,
indicating that it would not ratify a treaty that did not impose caps on
developing countries.11 The treaty was never submitted to Congress, and

7. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT, 62 (2007) [hereinafter SYNTHESIS REPORT].
8. It has been suggested that under the UNFCCC other nations could
successfully challenge the U.S. for its lack of action on climate change. See Liana G.T.
Wolf, Note, Countervailing a Hidden Subsidy: The U.S. Failure to Require Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Reductions, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 115 (2006) (arguing that “the failure
of the United States to impose the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions on
its energy intensive industries should be classified as a hidden subsidy subject to
countervailing duties” under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures). Once the U.S. has taken some action on the issue, however, such claims
are weakened considerably. Indeed, the Lieberman-Warner proposal includes a
“Statement of Policy” declaring, “It is the policy of the United States to work
proactively under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and, in other
appropriate forums, to establish binding agreements committing all major
greenhouse gas-emitting nations to contribute equitably to the reduction of global
greenhouse gas emissions.” America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th
Cong. § 6002(b)(1) (2007).
9. David M. Ackerman, Global Climate Change: Selected Legal Questions About the
Kyoto Protocol, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. DOC. No. 98-349, at 1 (2002).
10. See Charles Hanley, U.N. Scientist Urges U.S. to Cut Emissions, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2007, at A17. Kyoto required industrialized countries to reduce
their emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012.
11. The resolution, though not legally binding, deterred President Clinton from
ever submitting the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for ratification. Specifically, the
resolution stated:
the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other
agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or
94
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though there is no procedure by which the U.S. can remove its signature
from the Protocol, President George W. Bush later announced that his
administration did not intend to pursue ratification.12
Since then the U.S. has pursued a policy of lax emissions reduction
targets and voluntary action. In 2006, it helped form the Asia-Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP).13 This international
body was created to facilitate the sharing of environmental technologies
between its partner members. Similarly, an agreement by the G-8 nations to
improve technology sharing, the Gleneagles Plan of Action, iterates a policy
of voluntary action in the interest of energy efficiency.14 At best, such
policies have achieved a modicum of progress on climate change, at worst
they have undermined more serious efforts undertaken pursuant to the
goals of the UNFCCC by obfuscating the need for more meaningful
international commitments. Some commentators have suggested that
efforts such as the Gleneagles Plan divert momentum from working within
the Kyoto framework.15 But regardless of the intent behind the Gleneagles
Plan and the APP, it appears that most of the world is committed to a
mandatory framework, at least for developed nations. At the 2007 COP in
Bali, the parties pressed for a successor treaty to Kyoto and encouraged the
U.S. to get on board or to get out of the way.16 It has become apparent to

thereafter, which would – (A) mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the
protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing
Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would result in
serious harm to the economy of the United States.
S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
12. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 2-3.
13. The APP Charter states that one of the Partnership’s goals is to “[c]reate a
voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate
the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and
longer term cost-effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among
the Partners through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical
results.” Available at http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/charter.pdf.
14. The Gleneagles Plan of Action lays out “forward actions” countries can take
in the areas of energy use, research and development and monitoring illegal logging,
without imposing specific obligations on any country.
15. See, e.g., Robert Novak, Bush Withstands G-8 Heat on Kyoto, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
July 14, 2005, at 43.
16. Climate Change Conference Plants Small Seed; Industry Will Be Better Equipped to Deal
with New Regulations Following Bali Meeting, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 22, 2007, at D13
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many that the U.S. has stayed out of the game long enough and that
because the costs of dealing with climate change could double if action is
delayed even two years,17 the time to act is now.
Most policymakers understand that the only effective solution to this
global issue is global cooperation. Problems with free-riders and leakage
make it difficult, if not foolhardy, for individual nations to address climate
change on their own.18 If the U.S. acted alone, for instance, all countries
would receive at least a theoretical benefit from U.S. reductions in GHG
emissions, whether or not they made any sacrifices or reductions of their
own. Although U.S. historical emissions far surpass those of any other
country, the prospect of paying dearly to confer a benefit on the rest of the
world jars U.S. voters and policymakers, as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution
clearly indicates. Moreover, the leakage problem ensures that such
benevolence would be futile. Because production tends to migrate to where
the regulations are the weakest, well-intentioned domestic efforts may
produce the unintended consequence of moving manufacturing jobs outside
the country, where lax environmental controls result in greater amounts of
GHG emissions to produce the same output.
The unopposed passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution indicates how
firmly U.S. politicians oppose taking action in the absence of action by
developing countries.
Internationally, the U.S. has relinquished its
leadership role in this area by waiting for countries such as China and India
to make commitments to reducing GHG emissions.19 Domestically, it has
impeded efforts by states that are eager to begin taking action now.20 But as
the rising costs of delay become increasingly apparent, using the developing
world’s inaction as an excuse for further delay makes less sense every day.
In addition, as developing countries become more receptive to some

(stating that while the parties were not able to draft an agreement, they committed
to completing one by 2009).
17. International Aspects of a Cap and Trade Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp, Senior Counsel,
Environmental Defense Fund).
18. See Laura Thoms, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone and
Climate Change with Implications for Regime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 795, 798-99
(2003) (discussing how the global nature of the climate change coupled with “tragedy
of the commons” problems creates incentives for free riding and uncertainty about
whether parties will keep whatever commitments they make).
19. Though initially they too resisted the Kyoto Protocol, Australia and Canada
ratified it in December 2007. See Peter N. Spotts, Bali Climate Deal Sparks a Geopolitical
Shift, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1.
20. Individual states have successfully sued to force the federal government to
regulate CO2 emissions as it is required to do by the Clean Air Act. See
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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restrictions on their GHG emissions, this excuse for procrastination by the
U.S. may soon expire.
At long last, concern in the U.S. about climate change has reached the
level where legislators have begun to agree on the need for genuine action.
After years of efforts designed to create the illusion that the U.S. is taking
action through voluntary reductions and energy intensity pledges, U.S.
legislators are turning to mandated emissions restrictions and market-based
solutions. Proposals have been made ranging from the command-andcontrol variety to the imposition of a tax on carbon,21 but the approach most
likely to garner the necessary political support is a cap-and-trade program.
U.S. industry groups, perhaps attempting to postpone any change in the
status quo or perhaps recognizing that some mandatory regulation is
inevitable, are weighing in on how such a program could be implemented
without adversely affecting their interests. Recent legislative hearings have
focused on three main issues: (1) how the U.S. can encourage developing
countries to participate in reducing their emissions, (2) how U.S. industries
can remain on a level playing field with businesses in countries without
emissions caps, and (3) how a program can be structured and implemented
so that it will not violate the GATT or draw retaliatory action from U.S.
trading partners.22
Despite a broad and growing consensus that action needs to be taken,
considerable disagreements remain on how best to meet these objectives.
Unlike negotiating trade agreements which promise that the benefits will
outweigh the costs for all parties involved,23 reducing GHG emissions will
have an economic cost for all parties as environmental costs are
internalized.24 Though the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) estimates the cost of meaningfully addressing climate change at less
than three percent of world GDP in 2030, the crucial question is how those
costs will be divided equitably and efficiently.25 An allowance trading system

21. See John A. Barrett, Jr., The Global Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem
and a Taxing Solution, 76 IND. L.J. 829 (2001) (analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches from a policy standpoint).
22. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
23. See generally, Nita Ghei, Evaluating the WTO’s Two Step Test for Environmental
Measures Under Article XX, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 117, 120-21 (2007)
(discussing how the economic models developed by Adam Smith and David Ricardo
support the proposition that international trade is a positive sum game).
24. Some have suggested that shifting to a low-carbon economy will be a net
gain for the U.S.; however, this argument has yet to persuade a critical mass of
policymakers. See, e.g., Eric Shaffner, Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting
Out the Kyoto Protocol to Its Economic Detriment?, 37 ENVTL. L. 441 (2007).
25. SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 69.
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minimizes the cost of complying with an imposed cap, despite some
administrative costs and the potential for volatility in the price of
allowances. However, energy-intensive industries in the U.S. perceive any
additional cost as putting them at a competitive disadvantage with
importers who are not subject to the same restrictions as they are. This has
been the basis for industry and labor’s usual opposition to national
proposals to address climate change and the reason why climate change
negotiations have stalled since Byrd-Hagel.

III. Cap-and-Trade Under the Lieberman-Warner Proposal
Senate Bill 2191 appears to offer a way past this traditional confluence
of opposition. As the approach that has garnered the most political support
so far, it portends what U.S. climate change legislation will probably look
like. Even the American Electric Power Company and the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers now support creating a domestic cap-andtrade program that would require importers to submit “international reserve
allowances” equivalent in value to the permits domestic producers had to
buy under the program. Countries that took “comparable action” on
reducing GHG emissions would be exempt from the allowance requirement.
Thus, the real aspiration behind this approach is that it will prompt
developing countries to take action, obviating the need to assess the
allowances. However, some lawmakers have pointed out that resistance
from other countries is likely to be quite strong.26 In addition, whether
importers adopt more stringent environmental standards or pass on the
costs of allowances to consumers, U.S. consumers and importers of raw
materials will in any event face higher prices. Though this approach has its
complexities and is likely to be challenged in a WTO proceeding, legislators
are hoping that it never reaches the crucible of a WTO panel – that the pull
of the U.S. market and the push of international opinion will encourage
developing countries that are major emitters to adopt a comparable
emissions regime well before any type of trade sanction gets assessed or
imposed.
This bold strategy carries risks. There is the possibility that affected
countries will impose retaliatory tariffs or other trade measures that could
trigger a trade war.27 Of course, there is no absolute certainty how a WTO
panel will rule in such a situation. Thus, it is important to understand where
such proposals could run afoul of U.S. obligations under the WTO for two

26. Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery) (suggesting that just as
the U.S. has been unable to persuade China on the issue of currency reform, it could
not persuade China to adopt GHG emissions measures by requiring international
reserve allowances).
27. Green Protectionism, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2007, at 58.
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reasons: To make the sanction of having to purchase allowances more
credible, and to provide a firm foundation for protecting U.S. interests in a
WTO proceeding, should it have to defend itself before a Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) or challenge another country’s retaliatory action as inconsistent
with the GATT.

A. International Reserve Allowances
To stabilize the playing field for domestic energy-intensive industries,
importers would be required to purchase allowances similar to the ones U.S.
producers would purchase under a cap-and-trade program.28 These would
be assessed solely on energy-intensive imports such as steel, aluminum,
cement, glass, and paper.29 Energy-intensive imports from countries that
take comparable action on restricting GHGs would be exempt from having to
be accompanied by allowances. In addition, imports from countries
emitting less than 0.5 percent of global GHG emissions would be exempt.30
Title VI of the bill would allow the President to make an assessment of
whether measures adopted in a particular country were “comparable in
effect to actions carried out by the United States” to limit GHGs,31 while the
Administrator would be required to determine a baseline emission level for
each importing country as well as the price of allowances.32 Under the latest
version of the bill, emissions for U.S. producers would be capped beginning
in 2012, the fee amounts would be determined beginning in 2019 and
importers from countries that have not taken comparable action would be
charged beginning in 2020. Ideally, this would encourage other countries
with large emissions of GHGs to implement a cap or regulate their energyintensive industries within the near future. The eight-year delay may also
facilitate WTO compliance. However, industry advocates support reducing
the delay to as short as possible so as not to disadvantage U.S. producers in
the short term.

28. The proposal co-authored by the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers and American Electric (IBEW-AEP proposal) would apply to products such
as iron, steel, aluminum, cement, glass and paper. Rosalie Westenskow, Trade Worries
Tangle CO2 Plan, UPI ENERGY, Mar. 10, 2008, at 1.
29. Developing Countries Singled Out As Growing Climate Issue, CONGRESS DAILY, Mar.
6, 2008, at 1.
30. America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 6006(b)
(2007) [hereinafter Climate Security Act].
31. Id. § 6001(2).
32. Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at §§ 6001(1), 6006(a).
99

West

Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009

B. General Provisions of the GATT
The goal of free trade is to eliminate restrictions on trade so that each
country concentrates its production where it has a comparative advantage.33
Thus, a guiding principle of the GATT is that “like products” are not
discriminated against in international trade, regardless of the policy reasons
for distinguishing between them. This core requirement poses a formidable
obstacle to justifying international reserve allowances under both the
national treatment and most-favored nation (MFN) provisions of the treaty.
1. National Treatment
National treatment is a primary obligation under the WTO – imports
from other Members are to be treated the same as the domestic products
with which they compete. Taxes, regulations and other measures “should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production.”34 Moreover, Article III:2 states that imports “shall
not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products.” In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the Appellate Body laid
out a two-part test for determining whether an internal measure violates
Article III:2: “first, whether the taxed imported and domestic products are
‘like’ and, second, whether the taxes applied to the imported products are ‘in
excess of’ those applied to the like domestic products.”35
Under Title VI of the Lieberman-Warner proposal, a “covered good” is
an imported primary product that results in a substantial quantity of GHG
emissions and is “closely related” to a U.S. good that is more costly to
produce under the U.S. cap-and-trade regime.36 There is little doubt that any
“closely related” good under Lieberman-Warner would meet the definition of
a “directly competitive or substitutable” product within the meaning of the
second sentence of Article III:2. Such imports might even be considered
“like” domestic products within the meaning of the first prong of the Article
III:2 test laid out in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, even though the meaning of
“like products” is construed narrowly there.37 Under either standard, if an
import were not “directly competitive” with or “like” a domestic product,

33. See Ghei, supra note 23, at 123.
34. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III:1, Oct. 31, 1947 [hereinafter GATT].
35. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic
Beverages II), at 17-18, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II].
36. Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at § 6001(5).
37. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 35, at 20.
100

West

Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009

there would be no basis for requiring international reserve allowances in the
first place.
The key issue then is whether the allowance requirement would
impose a charge on imports “in excess of” the cost to U.S. producers. The
complaining party would bear the burden of proving that the price of
allowances exceeded the cost U.S. producers had to pay.38 Any excess at all
would be deemed a violation of the GATT, as “[e]ven the smallest amount of
‘excess’ is too much. ‘The prohibition of discriminatory taxes in Article III:2,
first sentence, is not conditional on a “trade effects test” nor is it qualified by
a de minimis standard.’”39 Furthermore, in Indonesia – Autos, the Panel found
that tax differences based on national origin are inherently inconsistent with
Article III:2, even if they result in an overall balance of less favorable
treatment and more favorable treatment that is not in excess of the overall
cost to domestic producers.40 Finally, the form of an internal charge and the
policy purposes behind it are irrelevant for Article III:2 purposes.41
Given the strict standard which applies to excess costs, a DSB would
likely scrutinize the cost of allowances closely. Because any added cost for
importers would be inconsistent with Article III:2, the allowance requirement
could lead to litigious wrangling over the appropriate price of allowances.
The requirement mandates that the Administrator does not err on the side
of over-charging importers for allowances. Importing Members could also
argue that because the allowance requirement is based on the national
origin of the products, if the price of allowances as to a single product is
greater than the corresponding domestic costs, the entire scheme violates
the GATT, as “averaging” is not permitted under WTO precedent. Lastly, the
laudable goal of reducing GHG emissions would not save the allowance
requirement if it were found to result in any less favorable treatment toward
imports.42 Thus, though the burden would be on the Member challenging
the allowance requirement, there are numerous pathways to demonstrate
that the measure is inconsistent with Article III:2.

38. Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 6.14, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/R
(July 11, 1996).
39. Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 35, at 24.
40. Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry
(Indonesia – Autos), ¶ 14.112, WT/DS54, 55, 59 & 64/R (July 2, 1998).
41. Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of
Finished Leather (Argentina – Hides and Leather), ¶ 11.144, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
42. Id. Under the chapeau of Article XX, measures do not have to meet this high
standard. See infra Part III.D.
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2. MFN
Article I:1 states that “any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
like product originated in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.”43 In other words, the GATT requires Members to treat
one another’s like products equally. Under Lieberman-Warner, some
countries presumably would not have to purchase allowances because they
had enacted comparable domestic measures to address GHG emissions
while others would because the President would have determined that they
had not enacted such measures. This would constitute an advantage to
some Members that is not accorded “immediately and unconditionally to
the like product” from another Member. Supporters of international reserve
allowances argue that because the U.S. would be imposing roughly the same
regulatory requirements on each country, such requirements are consistent
with the GATT. However, even though the proposal allows both the
President and the Administrator a substantial amount of discretion in
determining whether to require allowances and how much they will cost, the
unequivocal language in Article I indicates that this discretion would still be
bound by the general principles of the GATT.
Furthermore, by crafting obligations which focus on the products
themselves, the WTO eschews infringing upon the sovereignty of its
Members and attempts to maintain a sense of objectivity with regard to
internationally traded goods. Though the WTO has not categorically
rejected production and process measures (PPMs) as a legitimate means for
distinguishing between what would otherwise be considered “like products,”
the language of the GATT does not support such an approach under either
its national treatment or most-favored nation provisions. Requiring
importers to tender international reserve allowances would probably be
found to conflict with the MFN requirement for two reasons. First, it is clear
that the energy-intensive goods at issue, e.g., concrete, glass and steel, are
“like products” within the meaning of the MFN provision, just as they are for
national treatment purposes. Second, because “customs duties and charges
of any kind” trigger MFN treatment, requiring countries to submit
allowances purchased from the U.S. government is likely to be found illegal.
In short, the allowance requirement is likely to violate MFN and national
treatment obligations in the GATT. If international reserve allowances are
not consistent with the general provisions of the GATT, a dispute brought by
another Member would probably hinge upon whether the program could be
justified under the TBT Agreement or the exceptions listed in Article XX.

43. GATT, supra note 34, art. I:1.
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C. TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement delineates exceptions to the general WTO rules –
an express acknowledgement by its Members that technical regulations and
standards can facilitate international trade.44 Under the TBT Agreement,
Members may impose technical regulations to fulfill legitimate objectives as
long as they do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade and
are not more trade-restrictive than necessary.45 In addition, regulations
must comply with Article 2.1, which reiterates the theme of nondiscrimination found throughout the GATT.46
A Member seeking to challenge the international reserve allowances
requirement under the TBT Agreement would first have to show that it was
part of a “technical regulation,” bringing the measure within the purview of
the TBT Agreement. Then the challenging Member would have to show that
the measure does not fulfill a “legitimate objective” or that it is “more traderestrictive than necessary.” If either of these conditions is met, the
allowance requirement could not be justified under the TBT Agreement.
Only one dispute, EC – Sardines, has required detailed analysis of the TBT
Agreement, which suggests that novel interpretations by the U.S. of its
provisions are likely to generate disputes and litigation.
1. Technical Regulations
If a measure is not a “technical regulation,” it does not fall within the
scope of the TBT Agreement.47 Annex 1, paragraph 1, of the Agreement
defines a technical regulation as a “[d]ocument which lays down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including
the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is
mandatory.” This language creates three distinct requirements: (1) the
document must apply to an identifiable product or group of products, (2)
the document must lay down at least one characteristic of the product, and
(3) compliance with the characteristic or characteristics must be

44. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter
TBT Agreement]; see generally Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of
International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1999).
45. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, at art. 2.2.
46. Article 2.1 mandates that imports “shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products
originating in any other country.”
47. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (EC
– Sardines), ¶ 175, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate EC – Sardines].
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mandatory.48 Finally, specific provisions of a regulation are not to be
evaluated independently but rather “as an integrated whole.”49
Currently, whether the allowance requirement would qualify as a
technical regulation is uncertain. First, though a product does not have to
be expressly identified within a measure to be considered identifiable,50 the
measure does have to provide other Members with notice as to which
products are covered.51 Under the Lieberman-Warner bill, a “covered good”
is a primary product that generates a substantial quantity of GHG emissions
in the course of its manufacture and is closely related to a domestic good
whose cost is affected by the cap-and-trade program.52 Even if this
somewhat abstract language is held not to definitively identify the products
at issue by a DSB, it would not be difficult for the Administrator to
promulgate a more concrete list of affected products. Thus, the “identifiable
product” requirement will not pose an insurmountable obstacle to enforcing
the Lieberman-Warner proposal as it is currently written.
Second, the characteristics of the product do not have to be intrinsic
to the product itself – they can be merely “related to it.”53 The relevant
characteristics here would be that a product fits the above definition of a
covered good and comes from a country that has not taken comparable
action on reducing GHG emissions. On the one hand, the concepts of
“related processes and production methods” and “applicable administrative
provisions” might be stretched to the breaking point if they encompassed a
Member’s entire energy policy. For instance, suppose the U.S. required
allowances on China’s steel imports because it had not taken comparable
action on reducing GHG emissions. China could respond that even though
it has imposed no regulations on the steel industry, it has taken other
measures to reduce GHG emissions, such as rationing fuel for heating and
transportation, or perhaps it has planted a new forest in Indonesia to offset
its emissions. Therefore, according to China, the allowance requirement is

48. Id. ¶ 176.
49. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 64, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Appellate EC – Asbestos]. In EC – Asbestos, Canada contended that
French measures banning certain products containing asbestos fell within the scope
of the TBT Agreement; the Appellate Body agreed, finding that the measure
constituted a technical regulation when properly considered “as an integrated
whole.” Id. That is, because the measure permitted some uses of asbestos, it was
not a total prohibition – it contained permissive elements as well. Id.
50. Id. ¶ ¶ 180, 183.
51. Id. ¶ 185.
52. Climate Security Act, supra note 30.
53. EC – Asbestos, supra note 49, ¶ 89.
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not really about production methods or applicable administrative provisions
but rather an attempt by the U.S. to hoist the burdens of its own broad
policies onto another Member. On the other hand, the terms “production
methods” and “applicable administrative provisions” might cover a wide
spectrum as they are not patently limited by the terms of the TBT
Agreement. Thus, a DSB could decide either way on this issue, and today
the outcome can only be deduced by speculation.
DSBs have not devoted much attention to the third element, and it is
not necessary to do so here. The allowances clearly would be mandatory for
countries that do not take comparable action on climate change.
Nonetheless, assuming a DSB concluded that the allowance requirement
qualifies as a technical regulation, it does not necessarily follow that it
would be upheld.
2. Legitimate Objectives
Under the TBT Agreement, a technical regulation must serve a
legitimate purpose. The Preamble to the TBT Agreement recognizes the
right of Members to take measures necessary “for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health, [or] of the environment.” An inclusive list of
“legitimate objectives” is found in Article 2.2, including “protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.” The
Agreement permits Members to consider the risks of non-fulfillment based
on, inter alia, “available scientific and technical information, [or] related
processing technology.”54 These provisions and the growing body of
scientific data on climate change suggest that “legitimate objectives” would
be construed broadly enough by a DSB to support the U.S. position in a
dispute over international reserve allowances.
3. Least Trade-Restrictive Manner
Finally, when a Member departs from a relevant international
standard, it must do so in the least trade-restrictive manner so as not to
create an unnecessary obstacle to trade.55 Article 2.5 states that regulations
consistent with relevant international standards shall be presumed not to
create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade, implying that
regulations not in accordance with international standards will not be
entitled to such a presumption. Where relevant international standards
exist, Members are required to use them “as the basis for” their own
technical regulations, except that Members can depart from a relevant
international standard if it is an “ineffective or inappropriate means for the

54. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.2.
55. Id.
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fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.”56 The TBT Agreement does not
expressly address regulations where there are no relevant international
standards. Therefore, the status of a technical regulation that serves a
legitimate purpose could depend on (1) whether or not a relevant international
standard exists, and if so, (2) whether that standard was used “as a basis for” the
challenged regulation, and (3) whether that standard is effective and
appropriate. Also, how a DSB chooses to evaluate a Member’s regulation when
there are no relevant international standards remains to be seen.
a. Relevant International Standard
The term “standard” is defined in Annex 1, paragraph 2 of the TBT
Agreement as a “[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides . . . guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and
production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.” In EC –
Sardines, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s conclusion that a standard
established by “a recognized body” does not have to be approved by
consensus.57 Thus, a Member challenging the allowance requirement might
assert that the relevant international standard is the Kyoto Protocol, which
was created by a recognized body, the COP, to address GHG emissions, and
which embodies the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities.”58 If a DSB accepted this argument, the complaining
Member would still have to show that the U.S. departure from the relevant
international standard (i.e., from common but differentiated responsibilities
to comparable action) was not justified, even though the U.S. had never
agreed to be bound by the Protocol.59 The remainder of the analysis in this
subpart assumes a Kyoto-type agreement would provide a relevant
international standard with which to contrast the allowance requirement.
The possibility that a DSB would conclude that there is no relevant
international standard in this context is discussed below in Part III.C.3.d.
b. “As a Basis For”
If the Kyoto Protocol were found to provide a relevant international
standard, an even murkier question is whether it would be used “as a basis
for” the U.S. allowance requirement in accordance with Article 2.4. Again,

56. Id. art. 2.4.
57. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 227.
58. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 10, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
59. See Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 468-74 (2007)
(analyzing on the role of non-WTO agreements in interpreting WTO agreements).
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the burden would be on a challenging Member to show that that the
relevant international standard had not been used as a basis for the
allowance requirement.60 In EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body held that a
technical regulation must not “contradict” a relevant international
standard,61 but neither is a “rational relationship” between the regulation
and the international standard required.62 Though there is plenty of room
between these bookends, a challenging party could argue that the allowance
requirement contradicts a fundamental principle of the Kyoto Protocol by
placing a higher obligation on developing countries. Conversely, the U.S.
could argue that the allowance requirement is based on the subjective
notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and that the regulation
allows for a similar amount of discretion while seeking the same ends as the
Protocol. It is nearly impossible to predict how a DSB would resolve these
issues without the benefit of additional disputes clarifying the TBT
Agreement, so this requirement does not foreclose the possibility that the
allowance requirement would be upheld.
c. Effectiveness and Appropriateness
Members are justified in deviating from international standards when
those standards are deemed ineffective or inappropriate. In EC – Sardines,
the Panel and Appellate Body disagreed over which party had the burden of
showing that a relevant international standard was ineffective or
inappropriate to achieve a legitimate purpose. The Panel concluded that
once Peru had shown that the measure at issue was a technical regulation
and that a relevant international standard existed, the burden was on the
European Communities to demonstrate that that standard was “an
ineffective or inappropriate means to fulfill the legitimate objectives
pursued by the Regulation.”63 The Appellate Body reversed the Panel on this
point, concluding that to prove its claim, Peru had to establish that the
relevant international standard was effective and appropriate to fulfill the
legitimate objectives of the E.C. regulation.64 Put another way, if the
relevant international standard is an effective and appropriate way to

60. See Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 242 (agreeing with the Panel
and stating that “an international standard is used ‘as a basis for’ a technical
regulation when it is used as the principal constituent or fundamental principle for
the purpose of enacting the technical regulation”).
61. Id. ¶ 248.
62. Id. ¶ 247.
63. Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines (Panel EC –
Sardines), ¶ 7.52, WT/DS231/R (May 29, 2002) [hereinafter Panel EC – Sardines].
64. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 275.
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achieve the same objective, the Member’s deviation from it cannot be
justified under the TBT Agreement.
As of this note, it is too early to tell how effective the Kyoto Protocol
and its successor will be at addressing climate change. In large part, this
will depend on the outcome of future COPs, where the next Kyoto-style
agreement is to be completed in 2009.65 The appropriateness of the Protocol
under the WTO is less uncertain. Because DSBs have disapproved of
unilateral environmental measures, it is highly likely that multilateral
agreements such as Kyoto would receive more favorable treatment.66
d. In the Absence of a Relevant International Standard
Alternatively, a DSB might determine that the allowance requirement
is a technical regulation with a legitimate objective but that no relevant
international standard exists. It is still unclear how the U.S. regulation
would fair, but for different reasons. The language of the TBT Agreement
suggests that a regulation can be evaluated on its own merits, rather than in
the shadow of a relevant international standard, to determine whether it
creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade or is more trade-restrictive than
necessary.67 However, these parameters have yet to be fleshed out in
disputes between WTO Members. Another possibility is that a relevant
international standard could come into existence, for instance, once the
next round of COP negotiations is completed. In EC – Sardines, the Appellate
Body held that Members have “a continuing obligation” to ensure that their
technical regulations are consistent with the TBT Agreement.68 Thus, WTO
Members’ obligations under the TBT Agreement occupy a shifting terrain.
As this preliminary analysis indicates, the TBT Agreement does not
provide a solid basis for defending the allowance requirement contained in
the Lieberman-Warner bill. Though there are arguments that can and
probably will be made regarding their validity as technical regulations, for
the scheme to motivate developing countries such as China and India to
take comparative action, it needs to have a more credible justification under
the WTO. As discussed in the next section, Article XX could fortify the U.S.
allowance requirement in a way that the other provisions of the GATT
cannot.

65. See Spotts, supra note 19, at 1.
66. See Cinnamon Carlarne, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions
Between Free Trade and Environmental Objectives, 17 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 56-57,
84-86 (2006) (suggesting that current WTO rules are probably compatible with
multilateral environmental agreements but that its Members should clarify the role of
such agreements either by amending Article XX or adopting an interpretive decision).
67. TBT Agreement, supra note 44, art. 2.2.
68. Appellate EC – Sardines, supra note 47, ¶ 205.
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D. Article XX
“Sustainable development” is one of the clear objectives of the WTO.69
It is iterated throughout the GATT, most specifically in the provisions of
Article XX, where WTO Members have acknowledged the importance of
coordinating trade and environmental policies.70 The provisions of Article
XX have been recognized as “exceptions to substantive obligations
established in the GATT,”71 and the chapeau of Article XX is intended to
mark out “a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members under
varying substantive provisions” of the GATT.72 Hence, in U.S. – Gasoline, the
Appellate Body described a two-tiered test for analyzing Article XX claims:
First, the measure must fit comfortably within one of the listed exceptions;
and second, the measure must comply with the chapeau of Article XX.73
DSBs have applied the first part of the test permissively, but overcoming the
requirements of the chapeau has proved more difficult for Members
defending various measures before the WTO.

1. Paragraph (g)
Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures “relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.” Generally, the exception has been construed broadly.
“Exhaustible natural resources” is meant to be interpreted “in light of
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection
and conservation of the environment.”74 As a result, the Panel in US –
Gasoline had no trouble conceiving of clean air as an exhaustible resource.75
Nor is it particularly challenging to show that a measure is “primarily aimed”
at the conservation of the environment.76 A DSB looks to a regulation as a

69. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
70. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline at 30, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate US –
Gasoline].
71. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 121.
72. Id. at ¶¶ 156, 159.
73. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 22.
74. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 129.
75. Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
¶ 6.37, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Panel US – Gasoline].
76. See id. ¶ 6.40.
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whole, not just its trade-specific provisions, to determine whether it has a
legitimate objective within the meaning of this provision. In practice,
showing that a measure fits within the scope of one of the Article XX
exceptions has not proven difficult.77
The first prong of the two-tiered analysis discussed in US – Gasoline
would not impose a significant obstacle for the Lieberman-Warner
allowance requirement; the U.S. would not have much difficulty
demonstrating that the measure is encompassed by paragraph (g). Based
on contemporary concerns of the international community about addressing
climate change, a cap-and-trade program falls squarely within the scope of
measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.” In
addition, because clean air has already explicitly been labeled an
exhaustible natural resource, a GHG emissions regulation is not likely to be
found outside the scope of Article XX. Furthermore, the objective of the
regulation is fairly clear in this case, so it will easily satisfy the requirement
that it be “primarily aimed at” achieving a legitimate environmental purpose.
Again, the requirements of the chapeau raise tougher questions.

2. The Chapeau
The chapeau of Article XX expresses the general principle of good faith
in international law.78 Analysis of a measure under the chapeau is meant to
limit abuse of the Article XX exceptions by Members wishing to engage in
protectionism. To this end, the chapeau contains three overlapping yet
distinct prohibitions regarding the ways that a measure may be applied.
Namely, measures cannot arbitrarily discriminate between countries where
the same conditions prevail, unjustifiably discriminate between such
countries or restrict international trade in a disguised way.79 The chapeau
applies to discrimination where the same conditions prevail in the
importing and exporting countries as well as discrimination where the same
conditions prevail in various exporting countries.80 Thus the equalized
treatment required to satisfy the chapeau is analogous to the principles of
national treatment and MFN embodied in the rest of the GATT, though these
principles are applied differently in the context of Article XX.
If the allowance requirement is challenged, after showing that the
measure is encompassed by paragraph (g), the U.S. would have the burden
of making a prima facie showing that that measure does not constitute

77. Appellate US v. Gasoline, supra note 70, at 18 (discussing the “heavier task”
of proving abuse of an exception compared to provisionally justifying it under the
Article XX exceptions).
78. Id. at 13-14.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Id.
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abuse of the Article XX exceptions as defined in the chapeau. If the U.S. can
make this initial showing, which seems quite feasible, the burden would be
on the challenging Member to put forth arguments and evidence which
rebut U.S. claims that the measure is not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminatory or a disguised restriction on trade. Here, a number of likely
challenges are apparent, but if the U.S. is cautious about how it enacts and
applies its cap-and-trade program, it will have strong arguments in support
of its position.
a. Arbitrary Discrimination
When presented with claims of discrimination, DSBs have looked to
the manner in which a measure was enacted as well as the ways in which it
was applied and the outcomes it produced.
Thus, a finding of
discrimination might be based on a measure’s procedural or substantive
failings. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body disapproved of the manner in
which the U.S. had enacted legislation dealing with shrimp harvesting and
the use of turtle excluder devices (TEDs).81 After having required U.S. shrimp
trawlers to use TEDs, Congress passed a law banning shrimp imports from
countries that were not certified by the U.S. The policy did not address
differing conditions in each country and implemented a uniform standard
for other Members’ imports. In other words, the U.S. arbitrarily prescribed
its own TED regulations for importing countries. Noting that the U.S. had
not considered the possibility that different conditions might prevail in
those countries, the Appellate Body expressed vehement disapproval of the
measure: “[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt
essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, . . . without taking
into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of
those other Members.”82 Therefore, a program may violate the GATT
because of procedural shortcomings if it is enacted without regard for other
Members’ interests.
A country challenging the allowance program would likely analogize it
with the TED regulation, another performance standard which the U.S.
adopted first and then tried to coerce other countries into adopting. Part of
the problem with the TED rules was that there was no means for countries to
appeal the initial decisions of U.S. officials charged with implementing the
law.83 It is unclear how much process must be made available to

81. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 164.
82. Id. at ¶¶ 164-65.
83. One could argue that the reason procedural safeguards are not provided is
typically not that they are onerous in themselves, but that they make it impossible
for an entity to deny that it “knew better.” Thus, a DSB might require procedure as a
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international trading partners, but providing the hallmarks of due process –
notice of the details of the allowance requirement and an opportunity to be
heard – would not be burdensome. Some duly provided means to appeal
decisions and have them reviewed would probably suffice. Though this
might extend the time before the U.S. could impose the allowance
requirement and entail additional negotiation and litigation costs, the U.S.
could minimize these costs by putting countries on notice as soon as
possible about the allowance requirement and providing a clear process for
countries to raise their concerns before it takes effect.
In US – Shrimp, the application of the TED regulation also caused
problems. U.S. officials rigidly required countries to adopt “essentially the
same” program that the U.S. had in order to become certified.84 Officials
responsible for implementing the TED regulation did not follow a
transparent, predictable certification process, nor did they implement a
procedure for review or appeal once an application for certification was
denied.85 As discussed above, the Lieberman-Warner bill would grant the
President and the Administrator a considerable amount of discretion but
does not contain provisions regarding procedural review for countries
affected by the exercise of that discretion. While granting leeway to the
President and the Administrator may not in itself create substantial trade
issues, the care with which these officials use or abuse that discretion could
raise questions for a DSB.
In addition to finding that the “intended and actual coercive effect on
other governments” rendered U.S. rules on TEDs discriminatory,86 the
Appellate Body noted that the U.S. regulation created arbitrary results. For
example, even a vessel equipped with a TED could not import shrimp into
the U.S. if the country it hailed from had not enacted a regulatory framework
comparable to the one the U.S. had.87 Thus, discrimination occurred
because, as it was applied by U.S. officials, the TED regulation led to
arbitrary outcomes. Consequently, the U.S. will have to be wary of causing
arbitrary results when it requires importers to purchase allowances. For
instance, if a “green” foreign steel producer had to buy allowances because
its government had not taken comparable action to address climate change,
the result could be seen as arbitrary. Clean factories in developing countries
present a unique problem because under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), many developed nations are meeting their
targets by implementing programs in developing countries which reduce

stand-in for consideration, as it cannot actually force WTO Members to care about
one another’s interests.
84. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 161.
85. Id. ¶ 180.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id. ¶ 165.
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GHG emissions around the globe. To require allowances from a clean
foreign producer might be seen as an arbitrary result. On the other hand, in
the case of CDM projects at least, the U.S. could argue that emissions
reductions lack “additionality.”88 That is, they are essentially being counted
twice because a developed country is already getting credit for the
reductions, and counting them again as the equivalent of allowances made
in the U.S. industry defeats the legitimate objective behind having them.
The U.S. should craft clear guidelines in this area to avoid having to defend
against an apparently arbitrary result.89
b. Unjust Discrimination
The Appellate Body in US – Gasoline found unjust discrimination by the
U.S. because it implemented measures relating to gasoline refiners without
sufficiently cooperating with other governments to try to mitigate the effects
of the measure.90 US – Gasoline concerned EPA regulations on reformulated
gasoline that gave domestic refiners an option for compliance that was not
available to foreign refiners.91 Whereas domestic refiners could establish
individual baselines, which could be quite beneficial in the new regulatory
scheme, or were subject to a statutory baseline, foreign refiners were
automatically subject to a statutory baseline.92 Discriminating between
domestic and foreign refiners was unjust in that case because the U.S. had
not even attempted to collaborate with other countries to mitigate the
effects of the measure on their refiners. Here again, the process of enacting
the measure was part of what made it objectionable under the GATT.
Moreover, the U.S. did not consider the costs foreign refiners would face
under its rules for establishing baselines.93 Combined, these two flaws in
the U.S. legislative process resulted in unjust discrimination against its
international trading partners.
A challenging country could argue that the allowance requirement is
unjust because in the process of enacting its cap-and-trade regulations the
U.S. failed to cooperate with other countries or to give adequate
consideration to the costs of their compliance. A DSB is likely to be
unsympathetic if the U.S. fails to cooperate with foreign governments to

88. See Jennifer P. Morgan, Carbon Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: Risks and
Opportunities for Investors, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 177 (2006) (discussing the
additionality requirement in the context of gaining approval for CDM projects).
89. International offsets present other potential complications that are
discussed in Part V.B.
90. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 27.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 28.
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mitigate the costs of the allowances, such as by allowing foreign companies
the same opportunities that domestic ones have to purchase allowances
and to earn them through additional reductions and offsets. In other words,
it would be uncooperative of the U.S. to impose a statutory allowance
requirement on importers if it makes options available to domestic
producers that are not available internationally, as this was part of what
made the U.S. gasoline regulations illegal.94 Moreover, though this
shortcoming alone might not be sufficient to invalidate the allowance
requirement, a DSB might look to the cumulative effects of the regime, as it
did in US – Shrimp, to determine whether free trade had been unjustifiably
restricted.95
Alternatively, a challenging country could argue that the U.S. failed to
give adequate consideration to its costs, which were foreseeable when the
U.S. imposed the additional requirement.
The “comparable action”
provisions of an allowance scheme could also draw fire from international
trading partners. Though the Executive Branch would have discretion to
determine whether comparable action had been taken in another country,
exercising such discretion too narrowly could violate the GATT. Though the
U.S. would likely point to the level of GHG emissions in a developing
country such as China, China might point to different considerations that
the U.S. failed to adequately address. Such considerations include its
overall level of development, its significantly greater population or its lower
historical emissions, to argue that it did not receive due consideration
because of its different prevailing conditions. Or, if the U.S. applied a rule in
such a way that only an emissions cap could qualify as comparable action,
another country might point to per capita emissions as a more equitable
basis for comparison. Thus, decisions about comparable action in other
countries need to be based on flexible criteria, made with consideration for
the interests of U.S. trading partners and, ideally, preceded by discussions
with officials from the affected countries. This will offer a defense to claims
of arbitrary U.S. unilateralism.
c. Disguised Restrictions on Trade
Finally, whether a measure constitutes a “disguised restriction on
international trade” depends on many of the same factors that indicate

94. Appellate US – Gasoline, supra note 70, at 28.
95. US – Shrimp, supra note 3, ¶ 176 (“When the foregoing differences in the
means of application of Section 609 to various shrimp exporting countries are
considered in their cumulative effect, we find, and so hold, that those differences in
treatment constitute ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ between exporting countries
desiring certification in order to gain access to the United States shrimp market
within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX.”).
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arbitrary or unjust discrimination.96 Determining whether a measure is
“necessary” may be relative to the specific circumstances of a case. DSBs are
especially wary of protectionist measures couched as exceptions under
Article XX. Thus, a challenging country might argue that the allowance
program constituted a disguised restriction on trade because it protects U.S.
energy-intensive industries at the expense of other Members’ industries. To
the extent that the U.S. imposes allowance regulations that are out of sync
with the rest of the world, which continues to cooperate on ways to combat
climate change, its approach will appear to be designed to achieve other
objectives. By taking a flexible view of comparable action in other countries
and by allowing international offsets on terms similar to those of the EU
emissions trading system (ETS), the U.S. can avoid fashioning the allowance
requirement as an arbitrary restriction on trade.

D. Additional Policy Aspects of an Effective
Cap-and-Trade Regime
The concept of sustainable development is consistent with the notion
that promoting trade and protecting the environment need not be viewed as
a zero-sum game. A cap-and-trade approach to mitigating climate change,
particularly one that is negotiated multilaterally, is consistent with the
objectives of the GATT.97 Moreover, in the international context, the narrow
type of command-and-control regulations that have reduced environmental
dangers in other areas, such as curtailing the use of ozone-depleting
chemicals, are poorly suited for meeting the broad challenge of climate
change.98 Each country values its sovereignty. A cap-and-trade approach
gives countries flexibility in how they achieve emissions targets that benefit
everyone, and this flexibility is crucial to gaining the worldwide acceptance
and support that is necessary to tackle this problem. The sheer magnitude
of the changes necessary to switch to a low-carbon economy suggests that
the preferred approaches of individual countries will vary dramatically and
that a command-and-control scheme will meet with limited success.
Furthermore, the WTO has become a credible place for resolving the
world’s disputes, some of which deal only tangentially with trade.99 It is

96. See Appellate US v. Gasoline, supra note 70, at 25. There, the Appellate Body
concluded that the gasoline measures constituted both “unjustifiable discrimination” and
a “disguised restriction on international trade.” Id.
97. See Carlarne, supra note 66, at 54 (noting that GATT Panels have implied that
internationally negotiated environmental measures related to trade could provide
reasonable grounds for invoking Article XX’s exceptions).
98. Barrett, supra note 21, at 835.
99. See Andrew L. Strauss, From GATTzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the
Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
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important that environmental regulation, which traditionally lacks strong
enforcement mechanisms, be compatible with it.100 In addition, bringing
market forces to bear on the problem will help meet targets efficiently by
providing broad incentives for finding ways to reduce GHG emissions.
Whereas under a command-and-control regulatory approach emitters have
the incentive to reduce emissions only to a certain extent and to go no
further than necessary, a market approach with tradable allowances provides
an incentive to reduce emissions and to innovate as much as possible.101
Furthermore, as markets grow bigger they become more efficient, and
creating a program that has the capability of linking with the E.U. ETS, as
has been suggested by some commentators, will lead to lower costs of
compliance.102 Under a broad cap-and-trade program, reductions will first be
made where there is comparable reduction advantage. In other words, the
most cost effective changes will be made first, which should benefit some
countries and reduce costs for all.

IV. Carbon Intensity Standards
Shortly after declaring that the U.S. would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol
in 2001, President Bush announced plans that the U.S. would lower its
nationwide carbon intensity by 18 percent between 2002 and 2012.103 As
commentators have been quick to point out, however, unless emissions
intensity improves faster than the economy grows, under this framework
total GHG emissions will continue to rise.104 Indeed, the National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) projects GHG emissions will continue to increase
by 14 percent per decade even if the plan’s voluntary intensity targets are

769, 775 (1998) (arguing that the WTO could be “an effective forum for the creation
and enforcement of harmonized international standards relating to process
production methods . . . in such areas as clean air, clean water, hazardous waste,
occupational health and safety, and national resource preservation.”).
100. See id. at 815-16 (noting that environmental agreements often face stiff
opposition from certain corporate sectors but that comprehensive trade negotiations
that include environmental measures are likely to face less opposition because they
offer an overall benefit to those sectors).
101. Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Kjell Olav Kristiansen, Director,
Advisory Services, Point Carbon North America).
102.

See Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Jennifer Haverkamp).

103. NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, “EMISSIONS INTENSITY” – POLLUTION BY
ANY OTHER NAME? 2 (2005), http://www.nrdc.org/globalWarming/fintensity.asp
[hereinafter NRDC]; see also, Mary Anne Sullivan, Voluntary Plans Will Not Cut Greenhouse
Gas Emissions in the Electricity Sector, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 47, 47 (2006).
104.
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met.105
In addition, because the steel industry makes many nonstandardized products, applying carbon intensity standards in this area
poses extra administrative and accounting difficulties.
Alternatively,
emissions could be measured against economic output (e.g., by dollar value
created), but this poses another set of difficulties. Finally, there seems to be
little point in going through these calculations because, ultimately, “the
atmosphere doesn’t care about emissions intensity.”106
Although both Argentina and the U.K. have experimented with
intensity commitments, no developed country other than the U.S. currently
relies on this model to reduce its GHG emissions.107 Nevertheless, carbon
intensity standards have been resurrected by the steel industry in
congressional debates about GHG regulations. Members of the steel
industry do not support the Lieberman-Warner approach because they feel it
does not provide enough protection for domestic producers in energyintensive industries such as cement and steel. Some business leaders and
legislators evoke the specter of a worst-of-both-worlds scenario in which
GHG regulation leads to exportation of U.S. jobs and an actual increase in
emissions as countries without comparable emissions standards produce
abroad what was once made domestically with fewer GHG emissions.108
Carbon intensity standards, they argue, are designed to stem the export of
U.S. jobs, while encouraging foreign producers to adopt cleaner
technologies in the most energy-intensive sectors of the economy. They
argue further that their approach would lead to greater reductions in GHG
emissions than are likely to result from a cap-and-trade regime. However,
this approach also presents apparent conflicts with WTO obligations, and
intensity standards themselves, while not inherently lax, have yet to produce
meaningful progress on climate change.
A. Elements of the Proposal
The U.S. steel industry is advocating “carbon intensity standards” as an
alternative to or a component of national GHG legislation.109 Noting that
Chinese steel production results in emissions estimated to be two to three
times higher than U.S. production, the industry would like to see products
that fail to meet carbon intensity requirements banned from import into the

105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 4.

107.

HERZOG ET AL., supra note 1, at 10-11.

108. In addition, some legislators profess not to believe that climate change is
real. See Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Rep. Joe Barton).
109. U.S. Steel Makers Push Carbon-Intensity Approach to Climate Change. INSIDE USCHINA TRADE, Mar. 12, 2008, at 1.
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U.S. market.110 The industry argues that these performance standards would
be consistent with the GATT because they qualify as a “technical regulation”
under the TBT Agreement. Their approach could also be applied to
domestic and foreign producers simultaneously, they claim, which means it
would protect U.S. jobs in ways that temporally staggered provisions of the
Lieberman-Warner bill would not.111 However, the lack of a delay provision
raises further questions about compliance with WTO obligations.112 Though
the TBT Agreement provides a conceivable rationale under which carbon
intensity standards could be viewed as legitimate to a DSB, it would be
imprudent for the U.S. to rely exclusively on such a legal theory.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that even if such standards are
eventually upheld by a WTO panel, the possibility that they might not be
takes away from the credibility of the standards and their effectiveness at
prompting exporting countries to adopt comparable measures.
Carbon intensity standards have an even less colorable claim at being
compatible with the general provisions of the GATT than the LiebermanWarner approach. Article XI’s prohibition on quantitative restrictions on
trade is unequivocal: “No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, . . . shall be instituted or maintained . . . on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party.”113
Quantitative restrictions are the least-favored restrictions on trade, and a
ban on goods based on their carbon intensity is clearly inconsistent with
this provision of the GATT. Furthermore, the MFN provision of the GATT
presents another obvious obstacle to enforcing carbon intensity standards
because the U.S. would be subjecting goods from countries that did not
abide by the standards to less favorable treatment. Under current WTO
doctrine, the term “like product” in Article I is interpreted broadly, and DSBs
have not embraced differences based on PPMs. Nonetheless, proponents of
carbon intensity standards say they could be justified under the TBT
Agreement or Article XX.
B.

Carbon Intensity Standards and the TBT Agreement

As discussed above in Part III.C., should a Member wish to challenge
U.S. carbon intensity standards, it would first have to show that the
standards constitute a “technical regulation.” Then the challenging Member
would have to show that the regulation does not fulfill a “legitimate

110.

Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of James Slattery).

111. According to the current bill, international reserve allowances would not
be required of importers until 2020, whereas U.S. producers’ emissions would be
capped beginning in 2012. Climate Security Act, supra note 30, at § 6001 et seq.
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objective” or that it is “more trade-restrictive than necessary.” In addition,
the TBT Agreement contains particular notification provisions, which are
designed to give Members time to become acquainted with regulations
before they take effect. DSBs have had limited occasion to interpret the TBT
Agreement; perhaps the dearth of precedent analyzing its various provisions
makes it well suited as a screen upon which the steel industry can project its
own legal interpretations and draw theoretical legal conclusions that have
yet to be tested in practice. However, there is no guarantee that U.S. trading
partners will accede to such interpretations.
1. Technical Regulations
Carbon intensity standards meet the requirements of a technical
regulation much more easily than international reserve allowances do. As
discussed in Part III.C.1, a technical regulation must apply to an identifiable
product, lay down characteristics of that product and be mandatory. Unlike
the broadly defined products and characteristics in the Lieberman-Warner
bill, the products and characteristics of carbon intensity standards would
presumably be more specific. Because a technical regulation can be based
on either “product characteristics” or “processes and production methods,”
it is irrelevant to this analysis that the amount of carbon emitted in the
production of a product is not an inherent characteristic of the product
itself. And of course the standards would be mandatory. Furthermore, like
the incomplete ban in EC – Asbestos,114 under a carbon intensity regime, the
U.S. would not be instituting a complete ban on imports from specified
industries. Rather, only those products that did not meet the performance
standards would be excluded from U.S. markets. Thus, it appears likely that
carbon intensity standards would be analyzed as a technical regulation in a
WTO proceeding.
2. Legitimate Objectives
Again, the inclusive list of “legitimate objectives” found in Article 2.2,
including “protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment,” suggests that this requirement would be
construed liberally. There is little doubt that “legitimate objectives” would
be construed broadly enough by a DSB to support the validity of carbon
intensity standards taken as a whole, just as it would be in the event the
allowance requirement were challenged.

114. See Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), ¶ 8.72, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
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3. Least Trade-Restrictive Manner
The biggest problem with carbon intensity standards in a WTO dispute
is that they appear to be more trade restrictive than necessary or to create
an unnecessary obstacle to trade. Though the U.S. would have to explain
the justification for taking this approach,115 a challenging Member would
have to show that the measure was not necessary. Under the three-part test
laid out in EC v. Sardines and discussed in Part III.C.3, carbon intensity
standards would face formidable obstacles in a DSB dispute. First, either
the relevant international standard will be found within a multilateral
agreement addressing climate change such as the Kyoto Protocol or its
progeny, which raises one set of problems, or no such relevant standard will
be found to exist, which raises another set of problems. Second, even if
there is such a standard, it would not very likely be seen as the basis for
carbon intensity standards. Third, a standard developed through multilateral negotiation is probably an effective and appropriate way to address
climate change.
a. Relevant International Standard
As international negotiations on environmental agreements move
forward, they do not seem to be embracing the concept of carbon intensity
standards. Rather, there is a growing consensus that global GHG emissions
need to be capped to avert a global disaster.116 Thus, if there is a relevant
international standard or if one is emerging, it is based on absolute caps on
emissions, at least for developed countries. Although Argentina and the
U.K. have experimented with national energy-intensity standards,117 there
are no relevant international standards similar to those the U.S. steel
industry would promulgate. This is not fatal to carbon intensity standards,
but it does suggest that it could be difficult to defend this approach against
charges that it creates an unnecessary obstacle to trade. As discussed in
Part III.C.3.d, one can only speculate about how the TBT Agreement will be
interpreted in the absence of a relevant international standard.
b. “As a Basis For”
If a DSB finds there is a relevant international standard on GHG
emissions, a Member challenging carbon intensity standards would next
have to establish that it was not used “as a basis for” the U.S. measure to
prove that it is inconsistent with the GATT. It is difficult to reconcile the
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” with carbon
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intensity standards, which would impose the same level of efficiency and
responsibility on all producers of certain products. Moreover, it is fanciful to
suggest that the notion of capping emissions and trading allowances, which
the global community is embracing, is the basis for a command-and-control
type of regulation, which other Members are likely to believe infringes upon
their sovereignty. On the other hand, the U.S. might point to the Preamble
to the UNFCCC, which calls for “taking into account the possibilities for
achieving greater energy efficiency . . . through the application of new
technologies,” to argue that there are competing international standards in
the area of GHG regulation and that it has in fact used relevant international
standards as the basis for its approach. Still, it is much easier to imagine a
DSB agreeing with a Member’s assertion that relevant international
standards were not used as a basis for a U.S. measure implementing carbon
intensity standards.
c. Least Trade-Restrictive Means
Finally, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement permits Members to depart
from a relevant international standard if it would be an “ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.”
In EC v. Sardines, the Panel described an ineffective means as “a means which
does not have the function of accomplishing the legitimate objective
pursued.”118 In comparison, an inappropriate means is “a means which is not
specially suitable for the fulfillment of the legitimate objective pursued.”119
The Panel elaborated: “The question of effectiveness bears upon the results of
the means employed, whereas the question of appropriateness relates more
to the nature of the means employed.”120 Although multilateral agreements
addressing climate change are still evolving, the increasingly apparent
urgency of the problem combined with the understanding that major
emitters cannot be left out of the solution suggest that future agreements
will probably be the most effective and appropriate means of addressing
climate change given certain geopolitical realities.
While it is too early to judge the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, it
appears to be reducing GHG emissions to less than they would have been in
its absence.121 Given the scope of the problem and the timeframes involved,
a DSB would likely have to rely on projections to determine whether
particular measures are effective, which will depend on the specific
international agreements in place at the time carbon intensity standards
take effect. In terms of appropriateness, US – Shrimp strongly suggests that

118.

Panel EC – Sardines, supra note 63, ¶ 7.116.

119.

Id.

120.

Id.

121.

SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 62.
121

West

Northwest, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 2009

multilateral environmental agreements can fit comfortably with the WTO
framework.122 Again, predictions on how a DSB would rule can only be
speculative until there is more litigation involving the TBT Agreement.
However, there seem to be many paths to successfully challenging the
legality of carbon intensity standards.
4. Notification Provisions
The TBT Agreement also contains transparency-promoting provisions
that require Members to notify other Members about proposed regulations
whenever a relevant international standard does not exist or the regulation
is not in accordance with relevant international standards.123 Notifications
shall “take place at an early appropriate stage, when amendments can still
be introduced and comments taken into account.”124 Moreover, Members
are to “allow reasonable time for other Members to make comments in
writing, discuss these comments upon request, and take these written
comments and the results of these discussions into account.”125 Similar
provisions address conformity assessment procedures126 and enquiry
points.127 Additionally, “Members shall allow a reasonable interval between
the publication of technical regulations and their entry into force in order to
allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in
developing country Members, to adapt their products or methods of
production to the requirements of the importing Member.”128 Though these
procedural requirements do not pose substantive barriers to enacting
carbon intensity standards, they do create the potential for delay.
According to the steel industry, a major advantage of carbon intensity
standards over requiring international reserve allowances from importers is
that they could be implemented contemporaneously for importers and
domestic producers.129 In contrast, the Lieberman-Warner bill envisions a
delay of eight years between the imposition of the domestic cap on GHG
emissions and the requirement that importers from non-capped countries
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provide international reserve allowances.130 However, there is a high
likelihood that carbon intensity standards will entail some delay before they
apply to any producers, domestic or foreign. These delays increase the
overall cost of reducing GHG concentrations to safe levels, according to the
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.131
Furthermore, the provisions of the TBT Agreement are meant to
ensure that the concerns of developing countries in particular are
considered when Members adopt technical regulations.132 Although there
are no precedents elucidating the test to measure whether a Member had
adequately considered the concerns of developing countries, in light of the
express language of Article 2.12, blatant disregard for those concerns is
likely to draw criticism from a DSB.133 Thus, although the notification
provisions are not likely to be the basis on which a DSB invalidates a
technical regulation, a lack of transparency along with other problematic
aspects in the application of a regulation could contribute to its cumulative
effects, which could, in sum, violate the GATT.134

A. Carbon Intensity Standards and Article XX
In contrast to the lack of interpretative decisions regarding the TBT
Agreement, there is ample WTO precedent indicating that carbon intensity
standards would have significant barriers to overcome to be justified under
Article XX. In US – Shrimp, for example, the U.S. regulation regarding TEDs
was applied in a way that had a coercive effect on other nations because it
required a regulatory scheme that was “essentially the same” as the U.S.
approach to protecting sea turtles. Although U.S. officials are now
forewarned about applying the carbon intensity requirement according to a
rigid and unbending standard, there is less room for flexibility with carbon
intensity standards, which would require essentially the same production
methods for many products, than there is with international allowances.
This would depend on a more lenient standard, i.e., “comparable action” by
other WTO Members. Indeed, a fundamental reason why carbon intensity
standards appeal to various industry groups is that they can be tailored to
favor domestic industries. Further, they are rigid, making it onerous for
trading partners to comply with them. But this is not efficient, and therefore
this approach is fundamentally at odds with the WTO’s goal of promoting
market efficiency through liberalized trade policies.
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Moreover, one of the purported justifications for the TED regulations
that the Appellate Body rejected was that it would enhance the transfer of
technology to developing countries.135 The same argument is being made by
the steel industry today in support of carbon intensity standards.136
However, WTO precedent makes it clear that even if a measure can be
justified on policy grounds, it will not satisfy the requirements of the
chapeau if it results in arbitrary or unjust discrimination or is a disguised
restriction on trade. There is a strong likelihood that carbon intensity
standards would fail to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau to Article
XX. Given the numerous arguments that could be made as to their
arbitrariness and inappropriateness, it is not surprising that the steel
industry is looking to the TBT Agreement rather than Article XX as a basis for
defending their preferred approach.

B. Policy Features Related to Carbon Intensity Standards
Aside from the legal aspects of carbon intensity standards that make
them less than ideal, yet another, more fundamental, difficulty with this
approach is that reducing carbon intensity does not necessarily cut total
emissions. The Bush administration’s 2002 pledge to reduce carbon
intensity by 18 percent through voluntary efforts illustrates why a WTO panel
might look skeptically at carbon intensity standards. Because such
measures do not necessarily lead to reductions, it is hard to argue that they
are necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose. Furthermore, “because
performance standards do not encourage end users to reduce their
consumption of carbon intensive goods, they will leave behind some low
cost abatement opportunities, thereby raising the overall cost to all the rest
of us of achieving a particular emissions target.”137
Though carbon intensity standards are not inherently ineffective,
neither are they inherently effective. As most of the world has opted to
combat climate change by adopting regulatory schemes with absolute
targets, one can anticipate that a DSB may be critical of a Member
advocating a different approach that has not proven effective in the past. In
its assessment of intensity targets, the World Resources Institute concluded
that “[i]ntensity targets can work alongside absolute targets [but] data and
experience suggest that there is not a clear advantage of doing so.”138 The
steel industry has argued that the lure of U.S. markets will entice foreign
manufacturers to quickly adopt carbon-efficient technology that they
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otherwise would not have, at least with regard to the products made for the
U.S. market.139 Other Members may soon adopt similar measures, the
argument goes, furthering the effectiveness at reducing GHG emissions via
performance standards. This line of argument remains rather speculative.
At the same time, a key feature of intensity targets is that “the ultimate
environmental outcome cannot be known in advance with certainty.”140 Such
theoretical results are unlikely to be persuasive before a DSB. In addition,
carbon intensity standards have a shabby track record for reducing GHG
emissions in the U.S. Though it is true that this has more to do with their
lack of stringency than the form the emission targets have taken, this could
raise more concerns with a DSB, particularly as other Members are achieving
meaningful reductions in GHG emissions through other means.
Moreover, there is a growing consensus that global cooperation is
necessary to combat climate change, and carbon intensity standards are at
odds with the approach that has been favored internationally. General
principles of international law obligate nations to ensure that their actions
“conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for the
prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another
state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”141 Additionally,
the TBT Agreement requires that international standards be selected when
they are available. The carbon intensity approach does not conform to the
internationally recognized approach already underway with the Kyoto
Protocol. Another principle of international law is that nations who enter
international agreements should “refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the agreement.”142 Not only would carbon intensity
standards possibly conflict with the UNFCCC, which obligates all nations to
take action to combat climate change, it is also at odds with basic principles
of the GATT. Article XX requires environmental measures to avoid arbitrary
and unjust discrimination, but there are many indications that this is
precisely why they are favored by certain industry groups in the U.S.
Especially in the realm of environmental protection and when the U.S. until
recently carried the banner of the world’s greatest emitter of GHGs,
adherence to general principles of international law is key to promoting
earnest negotiation and cooperation.
Even if carbon intensity standards would be effective at reducing GHG
emissions, an even larger problem is their apparent inappropriateness. In
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EC – Asbestos, the Panel noted that “when a relevant international standard is
found to be an effective means, it does not automatically follow that it is
also an appropriate one.”143 Although protecting the environment by
limiting GHG emissions may be a legitimate objective, adopting measures
that ninety percent of U.S. industry already complies with and that are costly
for other Members to comply with would generate skepticism before a DSB.
Furthermore, the complexity of carbon intensity standards poses additional
administrative costs, which are difficult to justify in the absence of their
proven effectiveness. One way that technical regulations can inhibit
international trade is when demonstrating conformity with the regulation
results in undue costs.144 Because developing countries are less likely to
have adequate regulatory agencies and equipment in place, these costs
would be significant. When most of the cost of a technical regulation is
borne by countries least able to pay, a DSB is more likely to find the
measure to be an inappropriate means of achieving a legitimate objective.
Particularly when other regulatory schemes already in place such as
emissions trading reduce the costs associated with limiting GHG emissions,
a U.S. scheme that mandates those costs be borne by specified industries in
specified countries is likely to face intense scrutiny.

V. Some Additional Considerations for GHG Policy Design
Lawmakers agree that there is no silver bullet to stop the relentless
advance of climate change. Every approach to addressing this problem is an
imperfect one, but perhaps the least perfect one of all is to maintain the
status quo, in a perpetual staring contest with the developing world to see
who will blink first. The key is to stop blindly following a policy that
continues to make the problem worse and to take action that will open the
eyes of the market to the many available solutions. Senators Bingaman and
Specter145 sponsored a bill competing with Lieberman-Warner that offers a
suggestion of a few of the variations that are possible in a cap-and-trade
program that may be helpful to lawmakers seeking a politically feasible
approach. In addition, environmental groups such as the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) and the NRDC have testified before congressional
committees as to how the cap-and-trade framework can be adjusted to
produce the greatest results in terms of the environment at the least cost.
Other government agencies in the U.S. and abroad have analyzed the issue
in depth as well. Their collective contributions deserve mention here so as

143. Panel EC – Sardines, supra note 63, ¶ 7.116. See also Appellate EC –
Asbestos, supra note 49, ¶ 289 (noting that “it is conceptually possible that a
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to make it clear that even if carbon intensity standards are taken off the
table, lawmakers nevertheless have ample flexibility in designing an effective
GHG emissions program.
A. Safety Valve
A safety valve is a price limit on allowances – emitters can buy as many
allowances as they want at a particular price. The Lieberman-Warner bill
does not contain a safety valve; the hope is that this will provide greater
incentives for emitters to reduce their GHG emissions. Environmental
groups oppose having a price cap, noting that this would provide insufficient
incentives for businesses to innovate and reduce emissions.146 The IPCC’s
Fourth Assessment Report estimates that an effective carbon-price signal
would have to be around $20-80, though technological advances might
reduce that range to $5-65.147
The Bingaman-Specter proposal has garnered support from industry
groups such as the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers because it includes a price cap on
emissions credits, which it calls “technology accelerator payments.”148 The
fees collected would go to developing additional technology or assisting
workers who were displaced under a carbon-regulated economy. Under their
proposal, the cap would start at $12 per metric ton of carbon, increasing 5
percent above the rate of inflation each year.149 The National Commission
on Energy Policy recommended a similar policy in its August 2007 report.150
At first glance, a steadily increasing cap seems like a good way to
accommodate the concerns of each side; however, a safety valve would
preclude the U.S. from linking its trading system with the E.U. ETS.151
Because larger markets are inherently more efficient, the U.S. should not
pass on this opportunity to reduce costs.
B. Offsets
Offsets are emissions credits earned by those who reduce emissions.
In its latest form, the Lieberman-Warner bill would allow emitters to submit
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domestic offsets for up to 15 percent of their required allowances.152
Another 15 percent of their allowances could be earned from international
offsets.153 All offsets would have to be verified according to the regulations
promulgated by the Administrator.154 The E.U.’s experience with emissions
trading indicates how important offsets can be to achieving emissions
targets on schedule and at a reasonable cost. Interestingly, the allowance of
international offsets was a hard-won concession by the U.S. in the Kyoto
negotiations. As the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol gets
underway, it is already apparent to many European countries that the CDM
is the most important means for the EU to comply with its obligations.155
Members of the EDF have proposed amending the Lieberman-Warner
proposal to create an international market for GHG emissions credits and
allowing even countries without caps to participate, at least for a time, and
albeit their emissions would not be accepted on a one-to-one ratio with
reductions in countries where emissions are capped.156 Therefore, countries
without caps would still have an incentive to impose them. An additional
benefit for U.S. producers is that the access to international credits would
significantly reduce their compliance costs.
Provisionally allowing
international offsets would reduce compliance costs for U.S. industry in the
short term and pave the way for lower emissions worldwide in the long term.
Furthermore, accepting offsets as an international currency in emissions
trading would give importers an alternative to purchasing credits directly
from the U.S. This would add legitimacy to the requirement that
international reserve allowances accompany imports into the U.S. and
possibly preclude a DSB from finding unjust discrimination has resulted
from the program.
C. Targets and Scope
As with the multitude of allowance schemes in proposed bills, there
have been a number of proposed reduction targets based on various
percentages and baseline years. The Fourth Assessment Report suggests
that an appropriate target for developed countries would be a 60 percent to
80 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050.157 The target set in the
current version of the Lieberman-Warner proposal will not achieve this level
of reductions; the goals of the Bingaman-Specter bill are less ambitious.
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Because of the cumulative effect of GHGs in the atmosphere, current
reductions significantly reduce the amount of reductions that will eventually
be needed. However, most commentators agree that any movement in the
right direction by setting an absolute cap now will pay dividends.
Many commentators also agree that the lowest cost for reducing GHG
emissions would be achieved if all emissions were included in a cap-andtrade proposal, or alternatively, if a carbon tax were imposed across the
board on all energy consumption. The task of creating such a system is so
large that it might never happen. Meanwhile, a cap-and-trade program on
energy-intensive industries is a good place to start. This will address about
half of U.S. emissions from the outset, and the program is readily
expandable because allowances are tradable.

VI. Conclusion
Legislators who are reluctant to address the problem of climate
change will always be able to list reasons to “wait and see” before enacting
such a major piece of legislation. But it is abundantly clear that the costs of
addressing climate change increase exponentially with delay. Furthermore,
to be effective, a policy needs to have broad bipartisan appeal. Otherwise
the vicissitudes of the electorate will not provide the market stability and
adequate incentives to induce investment in innovation on the scale that is
needed. So now is the time to begin.
The cap-and-trade program embodied in Liberman-Warner is a good
place to start the transition into a low-carbon economy because it is based
on markets and probably consistent with WTO rules. This approach provides
incentives to move in the right direction and spreads the costs of
implementing major changes across a large portion of U.S. industry.
Furthermore, a U.S. cap-and-trade program would build on the progress of
the WTO in resolving international disputes on trade without having to
develop a separate enforcement regime as DSBs already have the recognized
authority to make sovereign governments act or face the threat of economic
sanctions from other Members. In contrast, though a performance
standards approach might offer a temporary respite for a few domestic
industries, in the long run it increases the costs of halting climate change
because it is narrower in scope and administratively costly. Moreover, the
close association of carbon intensity standards with lax environmental
policies of the past and present is likely to deter international cooperation
where it is crucial. Carbon intensity standards represent the latest in a
series of ineffective approaches that have enticed policymakers with the
proposition that the problem can be addressed without any real sacrifice on
the part of their constituents. It is time to make a clean break from such
policies. American citizens have shown an increasing willingness to make
some sacrifices in the global fight against climate change if they are evenly
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shared and produce real results – two outcomes that are least likely to result
from carbon intensity standards.
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